Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate? by Cochrane, James L.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 17, Issue 5 1993 Article 7
Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign
Firms Appropriate?
James L. Cochrane∗
∗New York Stock Exchange
Copyright c©1993 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
ARE U.S. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
FOR FOREIGN FIRMS APPROPRIATE?
James L. Cochrane*
One way to begin approaching the question of whether U.S.
regulatory requirements for foreign firms are appropriate is to
review some trends in the data. As shown in Figure 1 below, the
London Stock Exchange has already made significant strides in
becoming a transnational equity market for Europe. What re-
mains back in the home country - in Milan or Madrid - is
primarily the retail business. On average, London accounts for
30% of the trading in Continental European equities.
FIGURE 1. FOREIGN COMPANIES ON EIGHT MAJOR
STOCK MARKETS
1992 Average 1992 Foreign Turnover Number of
Daily Turnover as a Percentage of Foreign Companies
Market (millions of US $) Average Daily Turnover 1986 1989 1992
NYSE 6,782 6.8% 63 86 120
NASDAQ 3,508 3.6% 244 286 261
London 2,610 43.2% 584 599 522
Tokyo 1,931 0.3% 52 116 117
Germany 1,802 1.5% 266 535 594
Paris 500 2.3% 195 223 222
Zurich 339 8.5% 145 229 240
Hong Kong 315 0.1% 7 14 27
Investors are exhibiting a growing appetite to trade non-
North American securities in North American markets.
Purchases and sales of foreign equities in the United States, for
example, total over U.S.$350 billion.
Investors in the United States are quickly going from low
levels of foreign exposure in their equity portfolios to much
higher levels as they try to capture higher returns and lower
risk through international diversification. We are witnessing a
"once and for all" shift in the composition of the average portfo-
lio for equities, and if we do not make the regulatory changes
that will allow U.S. exchanges to fully participate in the growth
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FIGURE 2. PURCHASES AND SALES OF FOREIGN STOCKS IN
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of international trading, this "once and for all" shift may under-
mine the preeminence among world capital markets that the
U.S. capital market now enjoys.
One of the primary factors behind the massive growth of
foreign holdings in the United States is the rise of the U.S. insti-
tutional investor. As shown in Figure 3, the appetite for pen-
sions funds to increase their exposure to foreign stocks is ex-
panding rapidly, and the absolute amount of money flowing into
foreign markets as a consequence is enormous.
How will companies like Nestle or Siemens, as well as the
newly privatizing companies in the industrializing world, come
to the American capital markets if we don't resolve the existing
regulatory barriers? Are we going to look back five or six years
from now and say we missed the bus? The issue of foreign list-
ing standards is a critical and irreversible policy issue. If you
don't get it right, it's not something you can later fix; later is
going to be too late. One of the reasons for our concern and
for making the foreign listings issue our highest business prior-
ity, is that many people involved in policy in this area do not
seem to believe that it is an urgent problem.
Before getting into some of the issues of foreign listing stan-
dards, I'd like to make a couple of comments about American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs").' The NewYork Stock Exchange
1. See Joseph Velli, American Depositay Receipts: An Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. S38 (1994) (discussing increased use of ADRs as alternative for non-U.S. companies
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FIGURE 3. FOREIGN STOCKS IN U.S. PENSION
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("NYSE") is examining the possibility that Daimler-Benz as an
ADR in U.S. dollars may soon be traded side-by-side with
Daimler-Benz common stock in deutschemarks.' At what
point in time is the introduction of this particular combination
of trading feasible? We spend a lot of time looking into the
problems of an environment where a stock is traded in its home
country and, through the foreign exchange market, converted
to U.S. dollars, while the same stock is traded in the U.S. market
in dollars. Side-by-side trading may not be the right market
structure.
ADRs are the product institutional and retail customers
want because U.S. investors derive a great deal of comfort from
buying a security that is denominated in dollars, with a dividend
paid in dollars, through their own broker and a clearance and
settlement system with which they are familiar.3 Keep in mind
entering U.S. capital markets); Mark Saunders, American Depositary Receipts: An Intro-
duction to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 48 (1993)
(discussing use of ADRs by foreign private issuers raising capital in United States).
2. See Anita Raghavan, Big Board Studies Broadening Of Its Foreign-Stock Dealings,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994 at C1 (acknowledging NYSE's interest in trading foreign
stocks in different currencies, engaging in side-by-side trading).
3. See Velli, supra note 1, at S39 (discussing procedure for purchasing ADRs in
United States); Kerry Hannon, Live here, invest abroad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 4,
1994, at 65 (discussing growth of ADR market).
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the problem of foreign exchange risk. For example, assume
the Pound Sterling/dollar exchange rate is £1.00 for U.S.$2.00,
and that Glaxo is trading in London for £5.00. Then 100
shares of Glaxo is worth £500.00 or U.S.$1,000. If the ex-
change rate goes to 1:1 and if London trading remains the same,
the value of U.S. trading in Glaxo goes from U.S.$1,000 to
U.S.$500. It's a serious mistake to believe that because you're
dealing in a dollar-denominated world there is no foreign ex-
change risk.
The NYSE has had some difficult discussions with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") during the past couple
of years on the issue of requiring foreign companies to quantita-
tively reconcile their financial statements to U.S. generally ac-
cepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). 4  Clearly, we need to
find some compromise whereby an issuer like Nestle can move
out of an over-the-counter electronic pink sheet market, which
has no volume reporting and no real time quotes, to a listed
market - NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX - which has more effec-
tive overall regulation, without requiring U.S. GAAP reconcilia-
tion.
The NYSE's number one priority has been to find a solution
to this problem. This year we will list approximately forty new
foreign companies. Although this represents a record
number, it is minuscule relative to the 2,000 foreign companies
eligible to go on our list right now were it not for SEC regula-
tions requiring U.S. GAAP disclosure. While we are proud of
the forty foreign companies we will list this year, we are talking
about a universe of world-class companies that numbers in the
thousands. Foreign listings represent an opportunity that the
NYSE doesn't want to miss, both as a business and as an institu-
tion important to maintaining the international preeminence of
the U.S. securities market. The question is, how do we move
public policy from where we are now to an effective compro-
mise?
Exempting foreign issuers from quantitative reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP will not harm U.S. investors. Retail investors are
4. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01 (a) (2) (1993) (requiring reconciliation with
U.S. GAAP); see M. Elizabeth Rader, Accounting Issues in Cross-Border Securities Offerings,
17 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. S129 (1994) (discussing difficulties involved in reconciliation of
non-U.S. financial statements to U.S. GAAP).
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certainly not being protected by current SEC policy, which
forces the securities of world-class foreign companies that have
not reconciled to U.S. GAAP to trade on the over-the-counter
electronic bulletin board where no financial information is
made available to investors.5  Is the investor who just bought a
hundred shares of Nestle in that market being protected from
the alleged evils of Swiss accounting? I don't see how. Fur-
thermore, institutional investors typically buy a foreign com-
pany's security in that company's home market or in London
and employ management advisors to sort through the account-
ing and explain what's going on. If the retail customer now
goes to the electronic pink sheets and the institutional investor
now goes offshore to the "home" market or London, who are we
really protecting with current policy?
There is a growing consensus among experts that requiring
foreign companies to file additional U.S. GAAP reconciliation
after their home country documents are made public is of little
value to investors. These filings have no material impact on
the price of the stock, which is set by economic fundamentals in
the home country. Even when foreign companies go through
the work to reconcile with U.S. GAAP, U.S. investment analysts
following the company typically rely more on financial state-
ments based on home country accounting. If the stock is be-
ing priced in its home country using its own financials and it's
being priced here in the United States using home country
financials, what have we accomplished by forcing the company
through this particular kabuki?
I'm often asked on this particular issue about parity for the
U.S. issuer. If the NYSE achieves a compromise whereby for-
eign issuers have fewer hoops to jump through, wouldn't this be
unfair to domestic listed companies? What we have found, af-
ter two years of going to focus groups of CEOs, to The Business
Roundtable, and to our own Listed Company Advisory Commit-
tee, is that a large percentage of CEOs are reasonably objective
and, although some view it as a little unfair, they are nonetheless
5. But see Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time
of Economic Transformation, 17 FoRDH.u INT'L L.J. S77 (1994) (discussing superiority of
U.S. disclosure requirements and accounting practices); Richard Kosnik, The Role of the
SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAm INT'L L.J. S97
(1994) (discussing superiority of U.S. disclosure requirements and accounting prac-
tices).
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prepared to live with it if doing so helps to keep U.S. capital
markets strong. They are ready to accept a little bit of inequity
for the sake of that larger, more important goal. Although you
will hear from lots of people that domestic issuers will be "out-
raged" if any type of compromise is made, we have not found
that to be true.
Unfortunately, it is a fact of life that a certain amount of
protectionism resonates well among certain segments of the
business community. With respect to the issue of fairness for
domestic issuers, keep in mind that U.S. companies can cur-
rently issue shares and list them for trading in most major for-
eign markets without having to conform to foreign financial, dis-
closure, and accounting rules. This fact should be sufficient to
silence any protectionist protests.
How is this issue of foreign listing standards going to get
resolved? Our discussions with Arthur Levitt, the new Chair-
man of the SEC, have so far been very open and productive. I
would like to outline three potential avenues of compromise and
give you some of the pros and cons of each.
First, the NYSE has been working for two years on a compro-
mise that involves establishing specific quantitative criteria in or-
der to distinguish "world class" foreign companies. Relevant
criteria could include, for example, revenues of U.S.$5 billion
and market capitalization of U.S.$2 billion, or average weekly
trading volume outside the United States of at least U.S.$1 mil-
lion or 200,000 shares. Such world class non-U.S. issuers would
be required to register securities in accordance with current dis-
closure requirements. However, instead of quantitative recon-
ciliation to U.S. GAAP, independently-audited home-country fi-
nancial statements would be accepted, as long as they included a
written explanation of any material differences between home-
country accounting practices and U.S. GAAP. Although the
idea is not dead, and many still think it could be the avenue to
go down, there are problems with this approach, particularly the
legal problem of discriminating between companies on the basis
of some measurement of class and size.
While the first approach focuses on characterizing the solu-
tion in terms of the issuer, the second approach defines the solu-
tion by the characteristics of the investors and the market struc-
ture itself. It involves placing foreign issuers in a separate list
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with regard to the physical location of trading, entry to the con-
solidated tape, and overall dissemination of trades and quotes.
Access to this market would be limited to qualified investors, sim-
ilar to the approach taken in the Rule 144A6 market, or, less
rigidly, the approach taken in the U.S. derivatives markets,
where customers must be screened by a broker-dealer and
deemed appropriate. One problem here is the contradiction
inherent in "separate but equal": can a market that is separate
from public markets in fact be equal in quality to public mar-
kets? Additionally, foreign issuers have indicated that they are
not interested in a separate U.S. listing with non-U.S. financial
disclosure and limited access to investors. Their primary moti-
vation for entering U.S. capital markets is precisely the large and
growing retail demand for foreign equity.
The third approach, generically, is attempting to compro-
mise through accounting changes. There are four ways the
global accounting community, with the global regulatory com-
munity, can resolve the issue of foreign listings by focusing on
accounting.
The first is that U.S. GAAP grows in usage as more emerging
markets find it easier to penetrate the North American market
by simply conforming to U.S. GAAP. For example, the Chi-
nese companies that we have listed this year have no problem
with U.S. GAAP because, frankly, they are going from a rather
rudimentary accounting system to a very sophisticated one.
Because they need some sophisticated accounting system, why
not utilize U.S. GAAP? Although U.S. GAAP is spreading
around the world as issuers in newly industrializing countries use
it to tap our markets, it is presumptuous to assume that U.S.
GAAP will eventually become the "language" of international ac-
counting as English is the language of international business.
Many sophisticated, mature, industrial companies in Germany or
Switzerland - among others - do not appear willing to volun-
tarily conform to U.S. GAAP, even when the reconciliation
would not be particularly difficult.
The second approach is to continue or accelerate the SEC's
ad hoc accommodation of foreign issuers on a case-by-case basis
and relax the standards for what can pass as "equivalent to" U.S.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993).
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GAAP. Requiring full quantitative reconciliation is unneces-
sary because European accounting is not as bad as Americans
perceive, while U.S. GAAP is not as inflexible as Europeans per-
ceive. The differences are mostly a matter of degree rather
than principle and are not insurmountable. This process is al-
ready underway - accelerate it, and maybe more foreign com-
panies will find it less onerous to jump through the hoops to
register securities in the United States.
The third path is through mutual recognition of national
accounting and disclosure statements, perhaps with some agreed
upon minimum standard. This is the avenue that the regula-
tors would prefer to go down. However, trying to negotiate
mutual recognition on a bilateral basis will be a long-term pro-
cess. The U.S.-Canada multi-jurisdictional disclosure system
negotiations of 1992-93 are indicative of how tortuous and rela-
tively fruitless this approach can be.7
The fourth and, perhaps, most promising route would be
recognition by the SEC of the principles produced by the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC").8 IASC
has demonstrated a tremendous amount of leadership and is be-
ginning to make real progress. The IASC process now has mo-
mentum behind it under new SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt.
The SEC's recent acceptance of International Accounting Stan-
dard No. 7 on cash flow was a symbolic gesture on the part of the
SEC that there is a serious effort underway to move towards In-
ternational Accounting Standards. We take that as a very
strong sign of encouragement. As IASC principles are adopted
by more major non-U.S. issuers - and as these principles get
closer to U.S. GAAP - financials done by a foreign issuer using
them will be sufficient for U.S. investors to make completely in-
formed judgments about the issuer's state of health. European
companies have indicated that all they need is U.S. acceptance
of IASC principles and they'll be knocking down the door of the
NYSE and U.S. capital markets.
One observation about accounting to keep in mind, U.S.
7. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration
and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, Exchange
Act Release No. 29,354, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036-01 (July 1, 1991).
8. See Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets: Signifi-
cant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's Perspective, 17 FoRDHAt INr'L LJ. S120 (1994)
(discussing function and goals of International Accounting Standards Committee).
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GAAP is not pristine or pure. There is a lot of flexibility and
room for maneuver within U.S. GAAP, even for two domestic
companies. For example, Exxon and IBM both use U.S.
GAAP, but if you look at Exxon financials and IBM financials in
a line-by-line comparison, you're not comparing "apples to ap-
ples." The notion that U.S. GAAP presents a wonderfully clear
snapshot is misleading almost to the point of being dangerous.
Companies - both domestically and internationally - use ac-
counting differently in large part because of the different legal
and regulatory environments in which they operate. Conse-
quently, international accountants generally warn that quantita-
tively reconciling foreign accounting data to U.S. GAAP will
often convey an illusion of comparability that does not exist.
To understand a foreign company's financial position, one must
ultimately come to terms with the home country's legal and reg-
ulatory environment as well as it's accounting standards. In
the days following Daimler-Benz's recent NYSE listing, a major
U.S. bank sent out a cautionary tale detailing some of the
problems caused by superimposing U.S. GAAP on Daimler-
Benz's accounting. The report concluded that such forced
reconciliation had in fact produced more darkness than light.
In this public policy debate on foreign issuers, we in the
United States are hung up on measurement issues about specific
accounting items. Timely and useful, investor-oriented infor-
mation should be the primary goal of disclosure, not whether
one number is measured definitively.
For example, in a world in which Exxon is traded in New
York, Toronto, Tokyo, Frankfurt, London and Paris, if you're the
Chief Financial Officer of Exxon in Dallas and something mate-
rial happens to your company in Singapore at 3:00 a.m. Dallas
time, when should you announce that news? It is increasingly
difficult, particularly for the European companies, to figure out
when announcements should be made. We have had conver-
sations with CEOs who say that one of the reasons for their ner-
vousness about entering U.S. markets is their concern about the
content and timing of material moves.
From a public policy point of view, the issue of foreign list-
ing standards really does matter. Not thinking through the im-
plications of what we are doing - or not doing - could cause
some difficulty as we go further down the road. If we lose
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some of the international stature of our financial markets be-
cause of static regulations, we may never get it back. We need
to ensure that international trading flourishes in the United
States so that the U.S. capital market maintains its position as a
major international financial center.
